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I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine'
Prior Florida decisions2 appear to subscribe to the rule that the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine will not be applied to render the
* The decisions surveyed in this article have been reported in the Southern Reporter,
second series, volumes 156 through 176 and in the Federal Reporter, second series, volumes
323 through 348.
** Associate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in
Research and Writing for Freshmen.
1. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine renders the owner of a dangerous instrumentality, who consents, either expressly or impliedly, to its use by another, liable to third
persons injured as a result of the negligence of the person in whose care the instrumentality
was entrusted. The applicability of this doctrine to automobiles was recognized for the
first time in Florida in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
2. In Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So.2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960), the defendant automobile

owner was not held liable for the acts of the thief, even though the defendant left the keys
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owner of an automobile liable in a situation where a thief has stolen
the automobile and has operated it in negligent manner causing injury
to the plaintiff. However, in Tillman Chevrolet Co. v. Moore,3 the appellate court, in a slightly different factual situation, reached a contrary
conclusion. In that case, the defendant automobile dealer lent an automobile to Wills, for the limited purpose of driving it a distance of twelve
blocks. Wills then absconded with the vehicle and entrusted its operation
to a hitchhiker who collided with the plaintiff. In affirming that the defendant was vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the appellate court rejected the defendant dealer's argument that
the chain of causation between his act of lending the car and the plaintiff's injuries had been broken by Wills' subsequent acts of stealing the
automobile and entrusting its operation to a hitchhiker. The court reasoned that the defendant dealer consented in the first instance to the use
and thus distinguished the case from similar
of the automobile by Wills,
4
prior Florida decisions.
Application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is predicated
upon the "consent" of the owner.5 Under certain circumstances, the consent of the owner will be implied. An illustration of this latter proposition
was found in Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Allen.6 In that case, the
defendant truck owner parked his truck with the keys in the ignition in
such a manner as to block the only exit from a manufacturing plant.
From this manner of parking, the appellate court held that a jury could
properly conclude that the defendant impliedly consented that a third
person attempting to leave through the plant exit could move the truck
out of the way. The court rejected the defendant's contention that his
implied consent extended only to third persons qualified to drive the particular model truck owned by him.
In the absence of express or implied consent, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is inapplicable to the automobile owner. Therefore the
unauthorized use of a company truck by an employee will not visit
liability upon the employer for damages occasioned by the negligent
operation of the truck by the employee. 7
in the ignition in violation of a municipal and county ordinance. The court determined
that the issue was one of proximate cause. The court stated that the violation of the
ordinances was prima facie evidence of negligence, but went on to hold that the criminal
act broke the chain of causation. A similar result was obtained in Bryant v. Atlantic Car
Rental, Inc., 127 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). In the latter case, however, there was no
violation of any ordinance by the defendant. The decision was based on an absence of
proximate cause.
3. 175 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Floyd, 137 Fla. 301,
188 So. 601 (1939) (no liability for girl friend's driving).
4. Supra note 2.
5. Nichols v. McGraw, 152 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
6. 161 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
7. Keller v. Florida Power & Light Co., 156 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). Accord,
Hankerson v. Wilcox, 173 So.2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Fideli v. Colson, 165 So.2d 794
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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Where an automobile owner delivers his automobile into the
possession of a service station operator for repairs, and the car is driven
by a third person while in the service station operator's custody, the
owner is not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the
negligent operation by that third person. This result was obtained in
Petitte v. Welch.' The court's rationale was that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is based upon the concept of respondeat superior,
and when it affirmatively appears that the automobile was not driven by
an agent or servant of the owner, the doctrine is not applicable.
B. The Guest Statute'
The significant decisions arising under the Florida guest statute during the period encompassed in this survey involved situations where the
guest statute was held to be inapplicable to the plaintiff passenger.
In Rodriguez v. Gomez,'0 the plaintiff-appellant brought an action
against the driver and against the owner for injuries he sustained when
the automobile, in which he was a passenger, was involved in a collision.
Depositions and interrogatories indicated that the plaintiff's sole purpose
for being in the automobile was to ride to work with the defendant and
then return the car to the defendant's home. The record further established that this motivating purpose resulted in a tangible benefit to the
defendant. The trial court, in granting summary judgment for the defendant, held that the guest statute was applicable and therefore, absent
a showing of gross negligence, the plaintiff could not recover. The appellate court reversed and in doing so held that the guest statute is not
applicable where the motivating purpose of the transportation is solely
for the benefit of the owner or operator, or where the motivating purpose is beneficial to both the owner or operator and the passenger."
The minor plaintiff passenger in Nordone v. Richardson2 was a
student at Miami-Dade Junior College. The plaintiff brought an action for
8. 167 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), accord, Fry v. Robinson Printers, Inc., 155 So.2d
645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
9. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1963).
Liability to guest or passenger. No person transported by the owner or operator of
a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation,
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury,
death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such
motor vehicle, and unless such gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct
was the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought;
provided, that the question or issue of negligence, gross negligence, and willful or
wanton misconduct, and the question of proximate cause, and the issue or question
of assumed risk, shall in all such cases be solely for the jury; provided that nothing in this section shall apply to school children or other students being transported
to or from schools or places of learning in this state.
10. 175 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
11. Accord, Hertz Rental Co. v. Pitts, 174 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) (The sole
motivating purpose for the plaintiff's presence in the automobile was to care for the driver's
sick wife.).
12. 168 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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damages sustained when the defendant, who was transporting the plaintiff to the plaintiff's home, became involved in a collision. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant holding that the plaintiff
failed to show gross negligence, and therefore was precluded from recovery by the guest statute. On appeal, the court held that a state
supported junior college was a "place of learning" and that the plaintiff,
who was taking a course of instruction at that institution, was a "student"
within the meaning of the express exception13 to the application of the
statute. The court concluded that the statute was not applicable to the
plaintiff and that he would recover on a showing of simple negligence.
In another case,14 the plaintiff appellant was a student at the University of South Florida. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was
a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant and that the
defendant was transporting him from the school to the home of his
brother where he was going to spend the weekend. The plaintiff further
alleged that he was injured as a result of the defendant's simple negligence. One of the questions submitted to the jury was whether or not the
plaintiff came within the guest statute exception. The Third District
Court of Appeal, in reversing a jury verdict for the defendant, held, on
the basis of Nordone,'5 that it was error to submit the question of the
plaintiff's status under the guest statute to the jury. The court stated
that the record clearly indicated that the plaintiff was within the exception.
A plaintiff passenger must show gross negligence on the part of the
defendant driver so that his claim will not be barred by the guest statute. 16
Ordinarily, the question of gross negligence is for the jury." However,
in Webster v. Kemp,"8 the Third District Court of Appeal, in affirming
a summary judgment for the defendant, held that the defendant's knowledge of a defect' 9 in the automobile and his excessive speed 20 consti-a

13. Supra note 9. A student, who is being transported from an extracurricular activity

basketball game-held at a high school, does not fall within the statutory exception.

Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957).
14. Weiss v. Ballagh, 169 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
15. Nordone v. Richardson, 168 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). In this case discussed
supra in the text, the court expressly left open the question of whether a plaintiff over twentyone could come within the guest statute exception. However, in Weiss v. Ballagh, supra note
14, the court made no mention of the limitation, and from the decision it is not certain
that the plaintiff student who was afforded the benefit of the statutory exception, was a
minor. It could therefore be argued that the Weiss decision answered the question left open
in Nordone.
16. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959). The court defined gross negligence as:
[Tihat course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know would
probably and most likely result in injury to persons or property. To put it another
way, if the course of conduct is such that the likelihood of injury to other persons
or property is known by the actor to be imminent or 'clear and present' that
negligence is gross, whereas other negligence would be simple negligence. Id. at 22-23.
17. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959).
18. 156 So.2d 669 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).

19. The defect in the automobile was its tendency to "fishtail."
20. The defendant was travelling at a speed of from seventy-five to eighty miles per
hour.
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tuted simple negligence as a matter of law, and therefore recovery under
the guest statute would be denied. The Supreme Court of Florida granted
certiorari 2' and, in quashing the district court's opinion and remanding for further proceedings, held that where speed and a known defect,
directly related to the occurrence, combine to proximately cause an injury,
the question of22whether or not these factors constitute gross negligence
is for the jury.
C. Care Required of Motorists
1. REAR-END COLLISIONS

In Greyhound Corp. v. Ford,23 the defendant-appellant's bus struck
the rear of plaintiff's automobile. At the trial, both parties introduced
evidence on the issue of negligence. The trial court instructed the jury
that the defendant was presumed to be negligent and that it was for
them to determine whether or not this presumption had been explained
away by the facts and circumstances introduced into evidence. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that such an instruction
was erroneous. The court stated that the rule was:
that a presumption of negligence arises from a rear-end collision which 1., requires defendant to go forward with the evidence.... 2., is a rebuttable presumption. . . and 3., is a naked
presumption which is dissipated upon the introduction of evidence reflecting due care .... 21
However, where a defendant attempts to rebut the presumption of
negligence arising from a rear-end collision, by introducing evidence that
does not go directly to the issue of negligence, it is for the jury to determine whether or not the presumption has been rebutted. This conclusion was arrived at in Stark v. Vasquez2" where the defendant attempted
to explain away the presumption by stating that she did everything she
could to avoid hitting the automobile in front of her, and just did not
know why her car did not stop.
When the defendant introduces evidence to explain away the presumption of negligence which arises from a rear-end collision, and, from
the evidence introduced, a jury could properly infer the fact of "no
negligence," then in such a case, the defendant has successfully carried
his burden of explanation and the presumption is dissipated. This rule
21. Webster v. Kemp, 164 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1964).
22. If the defect is unknown to the defendant, or if the defect is not related to the occurrence, the rule would not apply. Similarly if the known defect does not combine with

speed, the rule is not applicable. The combination of the two factors raises the jury question.
23. 157 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). Accord, Baker v. Deeks, 176 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1965).
24. Greyhound Corp. v. Ford, 157 So.2d 427, 429 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
25. 168 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1964), quashing 155 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). Accord,
Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, 119 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
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was applied in Gulle v. Boggs,26 where the defendant struck the rear of
the plaintiff's automobile which was lawfully stopped at a traffic light.
The defendant introduced evidence that his brakes failed to operate thereby rendering the accident unavoidable. The evidence was conflicting as
to whether the defendant's brakes were in operating order. The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict
for the defendant, and ordered that a verdict be directed for the plaintiff
because the defendant's explanation was legally insufficient to rebut
the presumption of negligence. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and remanded, stating:
The presumption provides a prima facie case which shifts
to the defendant the burden to go forward with the evidence
to contradict or rebut the fact presumed. When the defendant
produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show
that the real fact is not as presumed, then the impact of 'the
presumption is dissipated.' Whether the ultimate fact has been
established must then be decided by the jury from all the evidence before it without the aid of the presumption.28
2.

VIOLATION

OF TRAFFIC

LAW

A violation of a traffic law is not negligence per se. A statement by
the trial court that a violation of a traffic ordinance creates a presumption of negligence is erroneous because a violation of an ordinance is
merely prima facie evidence of negligence,29 which evidence may be
overcome by proof of the circumstances surrounding the violation."
In Michalski v. Peaslee,' the plaintiff-appellant was speeding at the
time of the collision. The trial court, in granting summary judgment for
the defendant, held that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law,
and that his negligence proximately contributed to the collision. The
appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that where reasonable
men could differ, the question of whether or not a violation of a traffic
law was a proximate cause of the accident is for the jury to decide.
In Haislet v. Crowley,

2

the appellate court was indirectly3 3 faced

26. 174 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1965), quashing 162 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
27. Boggs v. Guelle, 162 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), cert. granted, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla.
1965).
28. Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26, 28-29 (Fla. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
29. Gudath v. Culp Lumber Co., 81 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1955); Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d
375 (Fla. 1954). The rule is applicable to violations of statutes, as well as to violations of
ordinances.
30. Marsicano v. Rogers, 164 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
31. 174 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).

32. 170 So.2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
33. The court was only indirectly concerned with a violation of the statute because

it was not clear from the wording of the statutes whether or not on the facts of the case
there had in fact been a violation. The court, therefore, had to construe the statutes in
order to determine the duty imposed by them upon the defendant motorist. However, once
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with the problem of a violation of a statute. In that case the defendantappellant was the driver of the first stopping automobile. She applied her
brakes, thereby activating her brake signal lamps, and came to a complete stop at an intersection which was controlled by a continuous green
traffic light. The plaintiff, who was following immediately behind her,
screeched to a stop and just missed colliding with the defendant's automobile. A third automobile following immediately behind the plaintiff's
was unable to stop, and therefore struck the rear of the plaintiff's automobile and drove it into the rear of the defendant's automobile. Two city
ordinances8 4 were introduced into evidence and provided in effect that
no one shall stop without first giving the driver in the rear an appropriate
hand or brake lamp signal. The trial court instructed the jury that a
motorist who makes a sudden stop without first ascertaining that such a
stop can be made with reasonable safety to other users of the highway,
may be found negligent." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
The appellate court reversed and remanded holding that the use of the
word "ascertaining" in the instruction, when taken in conjunction with
the rest of the instruction, placed a higher duty upon the defendant than
the law"6 imposes. The court then proceeded to define the duty owed
by the first stopping motorist to those motorists behind him as the duty
to give an "appropriate" signal prior to stopping or suddenly decreasing
speed. The court further stated that even though the defendant has
given a signal, it is for the jury to decide whether or not the signal was
"appropriate" in point of time under the circumstances.
Another statutory construction problem confronted the appellate
court in Eicholz v. Frey. 7 In this case, the plaintiff, who was riding a
bicycle, made a left turn in front of the defendant's automobile, and the
collision resulted. The trial court gave an instruction to the jury on secthe duty had been defined by the court, it was up to the jury to determine from the facts
whether the duty had been breached, and hence the statute violated.
34. The appellate court considered that the ordinances involved in the case were substantially identical to the following statutes:
FLA. STAT. § 317.371(3) (1963).
No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving
an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle
immediately to the rear, when there is opportunity to give such signal.
FLA. STAT.

§ 317.381(1) (1963).

The signals herein required shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or
by signal lamp or a signal device.
35. The jury was instructed that:
The law does not allow a motorist to make a sudden stop on a street or highway
without first ascertaining that such a stop can be made with reasonable safety to
other users of the highway. The fact that a motorist does make a sudden stop
without first ascertaining whether he can do so without endangering the safety
of other users of the highway may form the basis of finding of negligence on the
part of such driver. Haislet v. Crowley, 170 So.2d 88, 92 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
(Emphasis added.)
36. The law referred to by the court was the two ordinances involved in the case. The
ordinances were substantially identical to the statutes quoted supra note 34.
37. 173 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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tion 317.37 of the Florida Statutes3 s which provides that all vehicles must
give an appropriate signal for the last one hundred feet prior to turning.
The appellate court, in reversing a judgment entered on a jury verdict
for the defendant, held that a bicycle is not a "vehicle" within the meaning of chapter 317 and that it was therefore error to give the instruction
on section 317.37.
D. Defenses
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

In Wynne v. Adside, 9 the father of an eight-year-old girl obtained
a jury verdict in a wrongful death action which occurred when the defendant's tractor-trailer struck and killed the child. The appellate court, in
reversing final judgment for the plaintiff-father, held that it was error not
to charge the jury that the contributory negligence of the custodian of
the deceased child is imputed to the father. °
In a case of first impression" involving an issue of imputed negligence, the plaintiff-appellee brought a wrongful death action based upon
a collision between the defendant's train and a truck in which her deceased husband was a passenger. The decedent was the company supervisor of the driver of the truck. The trial court instructed the jury, in
effect, that the negligence of the driver is not imputed to the passenger,
and therefore even if the driver had been negligent, the plaintiff would
still be entitled to recover. 2 On appeal, the issue in the case was whether
the relationship of employee supervisor-passenger to employee-driver
was such as to impute the negligence of the driver to the passenger.4
38. FLA. STAT. § 317.37 (1961) is identical to FLA. STAT. § 317.371 (1963) which provides:
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during
not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
39. 163 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
40. In Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955), the court concluded that:
Where a father institutes an action for the wrongful death of a minor child it is
proper, if the facts so justify, as in the case before us, to assert against the father
the defense of contributory negligence grounded upon the negligent acts or failure
to act of the wife and mother of which the father has knowledge or should have
had knowledge. Id. at 593.
41. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Shiver, 172 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
42. The instruction which was approved by the appellate court is set out in the text
of the opinion at 172 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
43. After a review of Florida decisions involving imputed negligence, the court stated
that the general rule was that the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to the
passenger. However, the court went on to note that this rule is subject to exceptions:
The exceptions occur when the passenger has authority or control over the driver
of the vehicle 1. by imposing his will on the driver to see that the vehicle is properly
driven, 2. where such authority or control exists by virtue of the relationship of
agency or joint enterprise between the driver and passenger, or 3. where the
passenger-guest knows or should know that the driver is not exercising that degree
of care essential to the passenger's safety so that the law imposes a duty upon the
passenger to warn, protest, or take other action suitable to the circumstances of the
case, and the passenger fails in this duty although he has sufficient time and opportunity to give the warning or to protest prior to the accident and realizes that
intervention is necessary for his own safety. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Shiver, 172
So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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The court, in affirming judgment for the plaintiff, resolved the issue by
stating that servants of different grades or degrees of authority are fellow
servants, 44 and that the negligence of a servant-driver will not be imputed
to a fellow servant-passenger. 5
Raydel, Ltd. v.Medcalfe4 1 involved two issues, one as to the applicability of the guest statute, the other, imputed negligence. The plaintiff-appellee and her husband were domestic servants. They bargained
for, and received as a part of their compensation, the use of their employer's automobile. The plaintiff, who could not drive, was injured while
a passenger in the automobile which was negligently driven by her husband. Plaintiff recovered a 90,000 dollar jury verdict against her employer as owner of the automobile. The appellate. court affirmed the
judgment for plaintiff, holding that the guest statute was properly held
to be inapplicable by the trial court, and that the negligence of the
47
husband driver was not imputable to the wife passenger.
2.

4
LAST CLEAR CHANCE 8

The doctrine of last clear chance is not available to relieve a party of
liability for his own negligence unless both the plaintiff and the defendant
have been guilty of successive acts of negligence. 49 Nor, is the doctrine
available where the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant had the
last opportunity to avoid the injury. This latter conclusion was arrived
44. Accord, Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal. App. 22, 9 P.2d 867 (1932).
49. See Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 110 N.W.2d 29 (1961).
46. 162 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
47. The court stated the issue of imputed negligence to be: "Whether the wife as joint
entrustee is barred in an action against the owner because the driver is one who drives with
her consent." Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 162 So.2d 910, 913 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
48. The doctrine of last clear chance was formulated early at the common law in
mitigation of the harsh rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. Davies
v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842). For an informative article, see
Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida,17 U. Mrima L. REv. 582 (1963).
The elements that must be present before the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked
in Florida are as follows:
1) The injured party must have come into a position of peril;
2) The injuring party must know, or through the exercise of ordinary care should have
known that the injured party was in a position of peril and;
3) The injuring party must know or through the exercise of ordinary care should have
known that the injured party who was in a position of peril could not through the
exercise of reasonable care extract himself from his position or that the injured
party would not avail himself of the opportunities open to him to do so;
4) The injuring party must then have the opportunity through the exercise of reasonable care to avoid the injury and;
5) The injuring party must fail to exercise that reasonable care necessary to avoid the
injury.
The above elements were concisely stated in James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
Ordinarily the doctrine is invoked by a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent, but in
Florida it appears to be equally available to the defendant. Miami Beach Ry. v. Dohme, 131
Fla. 171, 179 So. 166 (1938) ; Kenegson v. Gerard, 164 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1964) (dictum).
49. Kenegson v. Gerard, 164 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1964) (dictum).
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at in Wilde v. Kelly, 50 where the plaintiff-appellant was contributorily
negligent in walking through two lanes of stopped traffic, into a third
lane of moving traffic and within forty-five feet of the defendant's lawfully moving automobile.
In Purdue v. Vogelsang,51 the plaintiff-appellant was struck by the
defendant's automobile when she was just "a step or two" across a forty
feet wide two-way traffic street. The plaintiff did not see the defendant's
automobile until it struck her. The defendant testified that he did not
see the plaintiff until she was "a step or two" into the lane in which he
was driving, and that at this time he was from sixty to seventy feet
away from her. The defendant testified further, that he applied his brakes
and skidded straight into the plaintiff. An eye witness testified that he
first saw the plaintiff starting across the street when the defendant was
from eighty to one hundred and thirty feet from the plaintiff. The appellate court, in reversing a final judgment entered on a directed verdict
for the defendant, held that the last clear chance doctrine was applicable.
The court stated that when the defendant first saw the plaintiff, she was
in a position of peril, at that point the defendant knew or should have
known that the plaintiff would not or could not escape from it, and
therefore the defendant failed to avail himself of the last opportunity
to avoid the accident, i.e., by turning to the left or to the right.
In Connolly v. Steakley,"2 the plaintiff-appellant was a seventy-eightyear-old woman. After looking in both directions, she started across the
street, but did not thereafter look in either direction. The defendant first
saw the plaintiff when she was from five to seven feet from the edge of the
street which was thirty feet wide. After turning to the left and applying
his brakes, the defendant struck the plaintiff near the center of the street.
On appeal, a judgment for the defendant was affirmed. The appellate
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that an instruction on last clear
chance would have been proper. The court reasoned that the doctrine was
not available to the plaintiff because she was not in a position of peril
when the defendant saw her.13
The appellate court in Kravitz v. Morse Auto Rentals, Inc.,5 4 held
that it was reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to give an instruction on last clear chance where it is reasonable to infer from the facts
that the defendant "should have seen" the plaintiff's perilous position
in time to avoid the injury.
50. 160 So.2d 713 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); accord, Nackman v. Miessen, 168 So.2d 711 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964).
51. 166 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
52. 165 So.2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
53. Compare Purdue v. Vogelsang, 166 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), with Connolly
v. Steakley, 165 So.2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
54. 166 So.2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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OTHER DEFENSES

The Supreme Court of Florida,55 in quashing an opinion by the
Second District Court of Appeal,56 held that where there is evidence from

which it can be inferred that the defendant did not see the minor child
which he struck until the child ran into the road in front of his truck,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the "sudden emergency
doctrine." It is then for the jury to determine whether or not the defendant had been negligent.57
A sudden unforeseeable loss of consciousness while driving an automobile is a complete defense to an action by an injured plaintiff. 8 However,

in Goodis v. Finkelstein,59 where the defendant-driver had knowledge
of the prior condition and that it would probably and most likely result in injury to others if she drove, the appellate court properly held
that the defense of loss of consciousness was not available and therefore
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff passenger.
A novel question of pleading the defense of sudden unforeseeable loss
of consciousness arose in Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray." The
defendant-appellant in his answer generally denied negligence. However,
in a deposition the defendant indicated that he suffered a sudden loss
of consciousness. The trial court entered summary judgment for the
plaintiff on the issue of liability. The defendant contended on appeal
that sudden unforeseeable loss of consciousness is not one of the affirmative defenses that must be specifically pleaded, 61 and could therefore
sufficiently be put in issue by a general denial. The majority of the
Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant's position
and therefore reversed and remanded the case. However, Associate Judge
Driver, in his dissenting opinion,6 2 pointed out that the defense of sudden
55. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Fowler, 176 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1965). Accord, Nabelski v.
Turner, 173 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
56. Fowler v. Midstate Hauling Co., 162 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), cert. granted,
176 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1965).
57. A correct statement of the sudden emergency doctrine may be found in the following
jury instruction:
Where the operator of a motor vehicle by a sudden emergency not due to his own
negligence, is placed in a position of imminent danger and has insufficient time to
determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as is required under ordinary circumstances, and if he pursues
a course of action to avoid an accident such as a person of ordinary prudence
placed in a like position might choose, he is not guilty of negligence even though
he did not adopt the wisest choice. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Fowler, 176 So.2d 87,
88 (Fla. 1965) (approved by implication).
58. Baker v. Hausman, 68 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1953); Malcom v. Patrick, 147 So.2d
188 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (An excellent review of prior Florida decisions dealing with loss of
consciousness.).
59. 174 So.2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
60. 171 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
61. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d) provides that certain enumerated defenses must be specifically
pleaded. Sudden loss of consciousness is not one of the enumerated defenses.
62. Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murrary, 171 So.2d 432, 434 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965)
(dissenting opinion).
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unforeseeable loss of consciousness goes beyond a general denial and in
fact constitutes a matter of avoidance on the issue of negligence and
must be specifically pleaded.
A defendant may be negligent, but unless his negligence is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, he will not be liable.63 In City of
St. Petersburg v. Shannon, 4 a case of first impression, the appellate court
was confronted with a unique factual situation which presented an issue
of proximate cause. In that case the plaintiff-appellant, who was driving
a police car, was injured when he lost control of his vehicle after it
struck a curb during a high speed pursuit of the defendant, a traffic law
violator. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint
holding that the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries and that the striking of the curb by the police vehicle
was an intervening efficient cause. The Second District Court of Appeal
was of the opinion that the issue was whether a defendant who has
violated various traffic laws and seeks to avoid arrest is liable for injuries sustained by the pursuing police officer and for property damage
suffered by the city when the police car is wrecked during the high speed
chase. The court held that the issue must be answered in the affirmative
and therefore the plaintiff's complaint should not have been dismissed.
Another case involving proximate cause was Ellingson v. Willis. 5
In that case, the defendant negligently collided with the plaintiff's automobile. As a result of the collision, the two automobiles blocked the highway. The plaintiff's wife and child had debarked from the car, and were
on their way off the highway, when they were struck by a third car. On
appeal, the defendant-appellant argued that the negligence of the driver
of the third car was an intervening, independent cause of the deaths of
the plaintiff's wife and minor child. In other words, the defendant argued
that his negligence was not the proximate cause. The court, in affirming
a judgment for the plaintiff, rejected the defendant's contentions, and
held that a jury could have lawfully concluded that the defendant's negligence was one, if not the sole proximate cause, of the second collision
and the deaths.
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ponds,66 the defendant-appellant
argued that its negligence in failing to sound a warning at a rail crossing
was not the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's husband. The
decedent had been a passenger in a truck. The driver of the truck saw
63. Cone v. Inter County Tel & Tel Co., 40 So.2d 148 (1949).
64. 156 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). Accord, Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 174
A.2d 149 (1961); McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958).
65. 170 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). This case is illustrative of the rule that the
chain of causation between the defendant's negligent conduct and the plaintiff's injury is
not broken by an intervening act of a third person where the intervening act or cause
is foreseeable.
66. 156 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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the train approaching in time to have stopped, but instead he negligently
misjudged the efficiency of his brakes and struck the train. The appellate
court held that the trial court erred in not granting the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict because, absent proof that the negligence
of the truck driver was foreseeable, the defendant could not be charged
with foresight. The court concluded that, because the negligence of the
truck driver was not reasonably foreseeable, it constituted an intervening
independent efficient cause and was therefore the sole proximate cause
of the collision.
In Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc.,67 the
plaintiff-appellant brought an action for the wrongful death of her husband. In her complaint, she alleged that her deceased husband drove to
the defendant's restaurant, turned the keys to his automobile over to
the defendant's servant, and then became obviously intoxicated. It was
further alleged that the defendant, by returning the automobile keys to
the obviously intoxicated decedent, breached a duty; namely, the duty
to refuse to return an automobile to an intoxicated customer. A further
allegation was, that as a result of the breach of this duty, the deceased
drove his automobile into Biscayne Bay and was drowned. A second
count in the complaint alleged that the defendant, as an inducement to his
customers, undertook the service of transporting intoxicated patrons to
their homes. The plaintiff alleged that the undertaking gave rise to a
duty to use reasonable care in transporting intoxicated patrons to their
homes, and that the defendant breached this duty. A third count contained allegations to the effect that the defendant, by his act of returning
the deceased's car keys, aided and abetted the deceased in violating two
Florida Statutes6" which prohibit driving while intoxicated, and therefore
the defendant's conduct was negligence per se. The Third District Court
of Appeal, in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action,6" took the position in respect to the first count that
the defendant's act of returning the car keys was not the proximate cause
of the deceased's death
because the death of the plaintiff's husband was the result of his
own negligence or his own voluntary act of rendering himself incapable of driving a car rather than the remote act of the
defendant in dispensing the liquor, or70delivering the ignition
keys and possession of the automobile.
67. 165 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
68. FLA. STAT. §§ 317.20, 860.01 (1963).
69. See Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961). The complaint stated a cause
of action on substantially identical facts. See generally Lambert and Rheingold, Commonlaw and Statutory Suits Against Tavern Owners, 28 NACCA L.J. 124 (1961-62); 31 NACCA
L.J. 121 (1965).
70. Reed v. Black Ceasar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964). See Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955).
See generally 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 430-46 (1947).
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The court held that the second count failed to state a cause of action because the plaintiff failed to allege that the decedent relied upon the defendant's undertaking. The third count was declared by the court to be
fatal because
assuming, arguendo, the validity of appellant's contention, still
no right of action would arise in this case since the plaintiff
would be barred as a matter of law by the same negligence that
is sought to be imputed to the defendant.7
II.

STATUTORY LIABILITY

A. Statutes Affecting the Right to Maintain an Action
The Florida statutes 72 providing for a cause of action in the case of
a wrongful death set the stage for three recent appellate court decisions.
In Guarnierev. Henderson,7 8 the First District Court of Appeal was
requested to answer the following certified question: Whether the father
of a twenty-year-old girl, who had been married for sixteen months prior
to her death, could maintain an action under section 768.03 of the Florida
Statutes for his daughter's wrongful death in an automobile collision.
The court answered the question in the negative, holding that the
marriage of the minor daughter changed her status for the purposes of
section 768.03 to that of an "adult." Therefore her father could not
maintain an action for her wrongful death.
The plaintiff-appellee in Young v. Garcia74 instituted a suit for
damages under section 768.02 of the Florida Statutes. The plaintiff and
the decedent had lived together as man and wife in Puerto Rico. They
were never ceremonially married, although they did intend to marry
eventually. The plaintiff's domicile was in Puerto Rico, and she and the
decedent never lived together in Florida. She alleged, in the alternative,
three theories in support of her standing under the statute to maintain
the wrongful death action: 1) that she was the widow of the decedent;
2) that she was bringing the action for the children of the deceased; and
3) that she and the children were bringing the action as dependents of
the decedent. The trial court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff
had standing. The appellate court, in reversing and remanding, stated
71. Reed v. Black Ceasar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964). But ef. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963) (sale of liquor to
minor in violation of statute); Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So.2d 189 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1959) (sale of gun to minor).
72. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1963) defines the right of action in wrongful death cases.
FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1963) specifies the persons entitled to bring the wrongful death
action and the damages that may be recovered.
FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1963) provides a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
minor.
73. 171 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
74. 172 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (a case of first impression).
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that ordinarily the law to be applied in wrongful death actions is the
law of the place where the wrongful death occurred. However, the court
noted that there was a split of authority on the question of what law
should be applied to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to maintain a wrongful death action. The court avoided aligning itself on either
side of this question by holding that under either choice of law, the
plaintiff was not the widow of the decedent. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff could not be considered the widow of the decedent under Puerto
Rican law because Puerto Rico does not recognize common law marriages.
Turning to Florida law, the court reasoned that the plaintiff could not
be the widow, because assuming arguendo that the plaintiff and the decedent did live together in Florida there could be no common law marriage
because the plaintiff and the decedent intended to marry at some future
date. The only question that remained for the court was whether the
children of the decedent could maintain the wrongful death action. On
this issue, the court held that the "children" named in the statute were
intended by the legislature to be the legitimate children of the decedent,
and therefore directed that on remand, the trial court should decide on
the children's right to maintain the suit by determining their legitimacy
by application of the law of the father's domicile, which was Puerto Rico.
In another case,7 the plaintiff and his wife were driving in their
station wagon when the defendant-appellant's automobile collided with
them. The plaintiff's wife died as a direct result of the collision. The plaintiff instituted an action for her wrongful death under sections 768.01
and 768.02 of the Florida Statutes, seeking to recover damages for loss
of his wife's services, for loss of her society, affection and consortium,
and also for funeral expenses. 76 The plaintiff had judgment in that suit.
The plaintiff then instituted the present suit, in common law negligence,
seeking to recover damages that he personally sustained and also damages
for injury to his automobile. After a judgment for the plaintiff in this
second suit, the defendant argued on appeal that the plaintiff's cause of
action arose from the same tortious act that was the subject of the prior
suit, and therefore, that the plaintiff had unlawfully split his cause of
action by not claiming all his damages in the first suit brought under the
wrongful death act. The appellate court rejected this argument, and in
affirming judgment for the plaintiff, held that the plaintiff had two causes
of action arising out of the same tortious act-one statutory and one
common law-and failure to join them did not constitute splitting of a
cause of action.
75. Bowie v. Reynolds, 161 -So.2d 882 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
76. It is interesting to note in regard to compensation for funeral expenses that in
Doby v. Griffin, 171 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), the court held that funeral and burial
expenses may not be recovered in an action brought under the survival statute-FrA. STAT.
§ 45.11 (1963).
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The plaintiff-appellant in Josephson v. Sweet" was injured by the
defendant's dog. The injury was inflicted "other than by biting." The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and in so
doing, held that since section 767.04 of the Florida Statutes superseded
and repealed section 767.01,78 the plaintiff was therefore relegated to
the common law where he could not recover because he failed to allege
that the defendant owner had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities.7 The Third District Court of Appeal, in reversing and remanding,
held that the trial court erred in requiring that the plaintiff allege that
the owner had prior knowledge of the dog's vicious nature. The court
reasoned that section 767.04 only superseded section 767.01 in dog bite
cases. The court concluded that since this was not a dog bite case, section
767.01 would therefore be applicable and the defendant would therefore
be liable irrespective of his knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities.
The Supreme Court of Florida80 affirmed the appellate court's decision
and candidly stated that they were receding from the obiter dictum8
which had served as the basis of the trial court's decision.8 2
The mere presence of the plaintiff in the dog owner's home as a guest
does not amount to an assumption of the risk of an injury "other than
by biting" under section 767.01 of the Florida Statutes, unless the plaintiff has reason to believe, based upon the dog's prior actions, that her
continued presence would probably result in injury from the dog."3
B. Federal Employer's Liability Act
Aside from two cases dealing with the degree of proof8 4 and the
degree of negligence85 necessary to maintain an action under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, the only other case worthy of mention is Florida
East Coast Ry. v. Hardee.86 In that case the plaintiff-appellee was in77. 173 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.), aff'd, 173 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965).
78. Section 767.01 of the Florida Statutes was enacted in 1901 and imposed liability on
dog owners for "any damage done by their dogs" to certain animals, "or to persons." In
1959 the legislature enacted section 767.04 which imposed liability on dog owners for
damages resulting from bites. In 1951 the Florida Supreme Court decided Romfh v. Berman,
56 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1951), and enunciated therein obiter dictum to the effect that the subsequent enactment of section 767.04 repealed and superseded section 767.01.
79. FLA. STAT. §§ 767.01, 767.04 (1963) have abrogated the common law to the extent
that recovery can be had under either section irrespective of the owner's knowledge of the
dog's vicious propensities.
80. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965).

81. The obiter dictum referred to by the court was announced in Romfh v. Berman, 56
So.2d 127, 128 (Fla. 1951) (dictum). See note 78 supra.
82. Sweet v. Josephson, supra note 80, at 446.
83. Knapp v. Ball, 175 So.2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
84. Southern Ry. v. Wood, 175 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) (substantially less than
in other actions).
85. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Cain, 175 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (the degree is

small).
86. 162 So.2d 704 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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jured when he alighted from a moving train onto a right-of-way which
was in a hazardous condition. On appeal from a final judgment entered
pursuant to a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant raised two
points. The defendant-appellant's first contention was that it was error
to instruct the jury that violation by the railroad of a safety rule or
regulation of the Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission was
prima facie evidence of negligence. The defendant's second contention
was that it was error to refuse to admit the Smith-Griffin Railroad Employee's Work Life Expectancy tables into evidence. The appellate court,
in reversing and remanding, held that the safety rule was properly admitted into evidence, but the instruction to the jury that "violation of
this rule constituted prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the railroad was error. '8 7 As to the second point, the court held that the
"tables" should be admitted into evidence where the injury was of a
permanent nature.
C. Railroad Operation
A catastrophic, but not unwarranted blow, befell the Florida comparative negligence statute8 in Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co.8 9 In that case, the defendant-appellant railway successfully
contended on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida that "times
have changed; that a statute which is valid when enacted may become
invalid by changes in the conditions to which it applies."90 The court
took judicial notice of the fact that railroads must compete with motorized transportation and concluded that it would be unfair to continue to
adhere to the former rationale that railroads could absorb the financial
burden imposed by the statute into their rate structure. The court, therefore, agreed with the defendant and held that the statute,
although perhaps valid when enacted, has now become a discriminatory and burdensome exercise of the police power because of changed conditions; and that it is, therefore, invalid
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
federal constitution and Section 12, Declaration of Rights,
Florida Constitution .... 91
III.

COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

A. Landlord and Tenant
There were only three landlord and tenant cases of any significance
decided during the period surveyed. In the first case a jury could have
87. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hardee, 162 So.2d 704, 704 (Fla. 3d Dist., 1964).
88. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1963).
89. 175 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
90. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1965).
91. Id. at 42.
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lawfully concluded that the defendant-landlord was liable to his tenant
for a conversion of the tenant's chattels, after the landlord removed the
chattels from a shed on the leased premises and 9 stored
them in his
2
warehouse while he proceeded to tear down the shed.
3 a dentist sought to recover damages for
In Ardell v. Milner,"
an
unlawful eviction by his landlord. One of the items claimed was damage
for loss of patients. The appellate court held that this was a proper
element of damages to be considered by the jury in an action against
the landlord.

A question of a landlord's liability for the negligence of his independent contractor arose in Ross v. Heitner9 The tenant's complaint alleged
that the landlord's independent contractor, an exterminating company,
was negligent in using certain chemicals and as a result an inherently
dangerous condition was created. The complaint further alleged that the
landlord's failure to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition was the
proximate cause of his injuries. The appellate court held that the complaint should not have been dismissed because the allegations brought
the case within the rule that "a landlord's duty is non-delegable as to
inherently dangerous work of an employed independent contractor." 9
B. Doctor-Patient
In Le leune Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson,"6 a mother took her elevenyear-old son to the defendant-appellant's hospital, upon the advice of her
doctor, to have the boy's appendix removed. The hospital undressed him,
examined him, and gave him medication. After about two hours, because the mother was unable to pay two hundred dollars in cash, the
boy was required to leave the hospital. In an action for wrongful discharge, the boy recovered compensatory damages, and the mother was
awarded punitive damages.9" The appellate court, in this first impression
case, held that a private hospital must respond for any damages suffered
by a patient who has been wrongfully discharged. The court noted that
the general rule is that a private hospital is under no duty to admit
patients, and may refuse admission for any reason, or for no reason at
all. However, the court found this rule to be inapplicable on the facts of
92. S.S. Jacobs Co. v. Weyrick, 164 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
93. 166 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
94. 156 So.2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
95. Ross v. Heitner, 156 So.2d 869, 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). The general rule is that
the person employing the independent contractor is not liable to third persons injured by
the independent contractor's negligence.
96. 171 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Note, 19 U. Mevn L. Rav. 652 (1965).
97. The boy was awarded $5,000 compensatory damages by the jury and his mother was
awarded $10,000 punitive damages. The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory
damages, but reversed a judgment for the mother entered for punitive damages because the
jury did not first award compensatory damages to the mother. Therefore an award of
punitive damages to the mother was improper.
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the instant case because "the hospital employees conducted themselves
in such manner as to leave no doubt that the boy was not only physically
admitted, but legally admitted to the hospital."9 On the issue of when
an "admission" occurs, the court stated that the "question of what acts
constitute an admission to a hospital vary with the circumstances..."99
but failure to fill out admission forms "cannot be the criterion for
determining admission."' '0 In concluding that there had been an admission, the court took cognizance of the fact that "the hospital had initiated
care and treatment of this patient and had taken further steps than
those necessary to determine whether or not they were going to admit
0
him.' '
The plaintiff-appellant in Trotter v. Hewett'0 2 brought a negligence
action against a dentist to recover damages for a broken jaw bone resulting from the dentist's attempted removal of an impacted wisdom tooth.
An affidavit by another dentist stated that the x-rays taken by the defendant were inadequate for a reasonably prudent dentist about to undertake the extraction. The trial court entered summary judgment for the
dentist. On appeal, the court reversed, and held that it was for the jury
to determine whether or not the failure to take proper x-rays was negligence, and whether or not such negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury. The court did note, however, that the broken jaw bone, the
injurious result, was not sufficient to raise an inference of negligence,
nor was it sufficient to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
An issue of informed consent was raised and resolved in Bowers v.
Talmage.10 In that case, the parents of a nine-year-old boy brought a
malpractice suit against a doctor who recommended that the boy undergo
a dangerous exploratory surgical operation.' The doctor suggested the
operation because there was some doubt as to whether the child's condition was organic or emotional. As a result of the operation, which was
performed by a surgeon, 10 the boy was partially paralyzed. The appellate
court reversed a judgment entered on a directed verdict for the defendant
doctor, and remanded the case for trial, holding that there was an issue of
fact which should have been submitted to the jury; namely, whether the
doctor obtained the informed consent of the parents. The court stated
the rule that unless the person consenting to the operation is made to
know the dangers or degree of danger attendant upon the operation, his
98. Le Jeune Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. 163 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).

103. 159 So.2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
104. The appellate court noted that in three per cent of the cases in which the operation
-an arteriogram-is performed, death or paralysis is known to result.

105. The court stated that the surgeon, who performed the operation, was entitled
to proceed on the basis that informed consent was obtained by the defendant doctor.
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((consent" is ineffectual. The court defined the duty of the physician as
the duty to adequately inform the person whose consent must be sought
and obtained of the dangers to be anticipated as a result of the operation. 06
In another case,"0 7 the appellate court affirmed judgments entered on
jury verdicts in favor of a husband and wife in an action against an
orthopedic surgeon for negligence and trespass founded upon the surgeon's failure to obtain informed consent. The husband and wife then
brought a second action, this time, against the internist who had been
engaged by them to take charge of the case. However, judgment in that
action was entered in favor of the defendant internist. On appeal,' the
issue was whether Dr. Harris, the internist, was also to be held liable,
with the orthopedic surgeon, for failure to obtain informed consent.'
The court affirmed the judgment entered in favor of the internist, and
in so doing resolved the issue thusly:
The fact that Dr. Harris was asked to "take charge" did not
make him responsible for the selection of the surgical processes
used by the orthopedic surgeon, as the facts show the determination and selection of those were made by the surgeon. The authorities relied on by appellants as to the necessity for consent
and informed consent to an operation are not applicable as to
Dr. Harris, who did not choose and advise the surgical processes
to be used by the orthopedic surgeon."'
C. Manufacturers and Suppliers
Products liability law is a relatively young, but rapidly expanding,
area of tort law. This is especially true in Florida. However, the courts, in
their apparent haste to augment the expansion, have created a state of
confusion. It may be many years before one will be able to sit down and
disentangle these multifarious decisions which are best characterized
by their irreconcilability. Therefore, the cases in this section will be
given a slightly extended treatment in the hope that this survey will
not add impetus to the disconformity.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that Florida has adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code. The Code which contains several sections
dealing exclusively with warranties"' will become effective on January 1,
106. For a fuller discussion of this case and its significance to Florida law, see Note, 18
U. MIAMI L. REV. 967 (1964).
107. Russell v. Harwick, 166 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
108. Harwick v. Harris, 166 So.2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
109. Compare Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So.2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) (doctor "in
charge" liable-surgeon not liable) with Russell v. Harwick, 166 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964) (surgeon liable) and Harwick v. Harris, 166 So.2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (doctor
"in charge" not liable).
110. Harwick v. Harris, supra note 108, at 913.
111. FLA. STAT. §§ 672.2-313---672.2-318 (1965).
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1967. Unfortunately, further discussion of the Code at this time, aside
from being premature, is impractical because of the nature and scope of
this article. However, attention will be drawn to sections of the Code
which parallel the surveyed cases.
In Wagner v. Mars, Inc.,112 the plaintiff-purchaser sought to recover
damages from the manufacturer for an alleged breach of an implied
warranty of fitness for use. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff
purchased a candy bar manufactured by the defendant and completely
sealed in a paper wrapper. It was further alleged that concealed within
the candy bar were several steel pins, one of which pierced the plaintiff's
tongue when she bit into it. The trial court dismissed the complaint and
held that an implied warranty of fitness for use does not extend to foodstuffs packaged solely in a paper wrapper. The Second District Court
of Appeal, in reversing and remanding, held that there is an implied warranty that food items in their original container are fit for the use or
purpose for which they were offered for sale and sold, and that one who
is injured by foreign substances contained therein which were unknown
to him may maintain an action against the retailer or the manufacturer
for breach of this implied warranty. This implied warranty was held by
the court to apply to candy bars in sealed paper wrappers.
The plaintiff-appellant in Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc.,"'
was injured when a one gallon glass bottle of milk she had lifted from a
supermarket dairy counter fell apart and landed on her foot. She brought
an action against the defendant-dairy based upon a breach of an implied
warranty. She alleged that the bottle was not reasonably fit for the use
intended. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court
entered an order granting a new trial to the dairy. On appeal, the defendant-dairy argued that its liability as supplier of the bottle was terminated
once the bottle was delivered to the store, since the defect in the bottle
could have been caused by a store employee's or by a customer's handling
of it. The appellate court, in reversing the order granting the new trial,
stated that an implied warranty of fitness for the use intended extends
to milk bottles and that a
defendant may not avail itself of the theory that a store employee or another customer, by moving the bottles, caused the
defect because to accept this theory would be to accept the
proposition that a supplier may use a package so fragile that
anticipated use is likely to create a dangerous condition.11 4
The question in the first Green v. American Tobacco Co."' case
112.
113.
114.
115.
673 (5th

166 So.2d 673 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
171 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
304 F.2d 70, modified on rehearing 304 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d
Cir. 1963).
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involved the accuracy of certain jury instructions. In that case the plaintiff's decedent, Edwin Green, had started smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes
in 1924 or 1925. He smoked from one to three packs of cigarettes per day.
His doctor informed him in 1956 that he had contracted lung cancer. In
1958, Green died. The plaintiffs' case, in which they sought to recover
damages incurred as a result of Green's smoking the defendant's cigarettes,
went to the jury on two theories, negligence and breach of implied warranty. The trial court instructed the jury in part that the cigarette manufacturer's implied warranty of fitness for human consumption does not
extend to harmful substances of which the manufacturer was unaware,
and of which, by the exercise of human skill and foresight, he could not
have become aware. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant
and answers to four interrogatories. The answers to three of the interrogatories were to the effect that Green had contracted lung cancer by
smoking the defendant's cigarettes, and that the lung cancer was the
cause of his death. By their "no" answer to the fourth interrogatory, the
jury determined that the defendant could not have known, by a reasonable application of human foresight, that a smoker, such as decedent
Green, would contract lung cancer from smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, after an extensive review
of Florida implied warranty decisions, affirmed the judgment for the
defendant and rejected the plaintiff's contention that the knowledge of
the defect was immaterial because the manufacturer was strictly liable
for a breach of an implied warranty.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal did, however, grant the petition
for rehearing by certifying the question to the Florida Supreme Court. 116
The Supreme Court of Florida, 117 answering the question" 8 in the affirmative, held that "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge is wholly irrevelent to his liability on the theory of
implied warranty....
Upon receipt of the affirmative answer to the certified question, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, in the second Green v. American Tobacco
Co. 20 case, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the ground
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a cigarette manufac116. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1962).
117. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See Sales-Implied
Warranty of Cigarette Manufacturers, 18 U. MAmi L. Rav. 502 (1963).
118. The certified question was as follows:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes
absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such
cigarettes . ..when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not . . .by
the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of
such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke
from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung? Id. at 170.
119. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
120. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
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turer's implied warranty of fitness for human consumption was dependent
upon his knowledge of the harmful substance.' 2 '
In King v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,'22 the wives of four passengers on a
Braniff Airline's plane brought a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer of the airplane and against the manufacturer of one of
the component parts, the engine. The complaint alleged negligence and
breach of an implied warranty in "that the equipment was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for the use intended."'1

23

The Braniff

plane crashed after a fire in one of its engines. It was alleged that the fire
was caused by a fatigue crack in the combustion chamber of the engine
which had been in use for three-thousand hours. In opposition to a motion
for summary judgment by the manufacturer of the airplane, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit of an aeronautical engineer which stated that the
design of the engine was faulty. The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed a summary judgment for the manufacturer of the airplane
and held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts, which if proved
to a jury's satisfaction, could have given rise to liability under the negligence theory and under the implied warranty theory.
The plaintiff-appellant in Arcade Steam Laundry v. Bass

24

alleged

that he purchased a hot water tank in reliance upon representations made
by the seller that such tanks were suitable for laundry use. The complaint
also alleged that the tank was unfit for the purpose and use for which it
was intended. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment
dismissing the complaint and held that where a buyer purchases goods
for a known purpose, the law implies a warranty that they will be fit
for the particular use and purpose intended.
This implied warranty of fitness for the particular use intended by
the buyer applies to plastic pipe purchased and installed in a lawn
sprinkling system. 2 5
An employee of the purchaser of a machine which was not reasonably fit for the use or purpose intended may maintain an action against
the manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty, even though there
was an absence of privity, as long as he was "one of those reasonably
121. The Green case is only one of the history making cigarette warranty cases. E.g.,
Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). See generally RESTATEMEST (SECoND),
TORTS § 402A (1965); Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Risks in Manufacturer's Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 515 (1963); 7 NACCA
NEws LETTER 121-22 (May 1964).
122. 159 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
123. King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108, 109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; Note 18 U.
MIAMI L. Rav. 950 (1964).
124. 159 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). See FLA. STAT. § 672.2-314 (1965).
125. Wisner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The
fact that the pipe lasted for six years is not determinative as a matter of law that the pipe
was reasonably fit for the use intended.
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intended to use the machine, and that when the injury occurred, the
machine was being used generally in the manner intended."'12 6
127
The trial court in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.
found that there had been a breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for a disclosed particular purpose by the seller of an electronic computer
and therefore declared a recision of the contract of sale 28 and ordered
the defendant-seller to refund the purchase price. The contract of sale
contained an express warranty clause and an integration clause."2 9 The
seller argued on appeal that the effect of the express warranty provision
was to exclude any implied warranty, and that the integration clause
also prevented any warranty from being implied. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal rejected both arguments and held that an express warranty
clause will not exclude an implied warranty which is not inconsistent with
the express warranty. The court held that an integration clause, unless
it explicitly excludes implied warranties, will not prevent the implication
of a warranty because an implied warranty of fitness for a known intended use arises independently of the contract of sale and will not be
excluded unless it is inconsistent with the written terms of the contract.180
An unusual factual situation presented itself in American Can Co. v.
Horlamus Corp.' There, the plaintiff-bakery had entered into a contract
with a bread company whereby the bakery agreed to sell its entire output
of canned bread to the bread company and the bread company, among
other things, agreed to furnish the cans. Thereafter, the bread company
entered into a sales contract for the purchase of the cans from the defendant-can company. This contract between the bread company and the
defendant-can company contained an express warranty clause and a disclaimer or limitation of liability clause.' 2 The bread company directed
126. Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 1965). See FiA.
STAT. § 672.2-318 (1965).

127. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
128. The contract of sale was entered into by the Florida corporation buyer in New
York. Therefore there was a conflicts of law issue as to what state law should be applied in
an action for recision of the contract for breach of an implied warranty. The appellate court
held that Florida law should be applied and not New York law which was applied by the
trial court.
129. The integration clause provided:
The entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof
is contained in this Agreement and no representation, except when made in writing
by a duly authorized officer of RRU, shall be deemed to be part of this Agreement,
nor shall this Agreement be deemed or construed to be modified, amended, rescinded,
cancelled or waived in whole or in part, except by a duly executed written agreement of the parties hereto or their lawful successors. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial
Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 1964).
130. Accord, FLA. STAT. § 672.2-316 (1965).
131. 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965).
132. ***All containers sold under this agreement are warranted by the supplier
against faulty workmanship and defective materials, but such containers are covered
by no other warranties, either express or implied. The supplier shall be liable to the
buyer for breach of the express warranty set forth in this paragraph, but the
supplier shall not otherwise be liable to any claimant, either in tort or in contract,
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that the purchased cans be delivered to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff
was in the process of filling the second shipment of cans with bread, it
was discovered that the cans were defective. The plaintiff notified the
bread company of the defects. The bread company, pursuant to its contract with the defendant, entered into an agreement releasing the defendant from all claims after the defendant had complied with the express
warranty clause. The plaintiff, however, brought an action against the
defendant-can company alleging breach of an implied warranty, and
sought to recover for operating loss expenses and loss of production
profits caused by the defective cans. The trial court excluded the contract
of sale containing the limitation of liability clause from the evidence
sought to be introduced by the defendant-can company, and held, as a
matter of law, that the defendant was liable. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the limitation of liability clause was binding upon the plaintiff-bakery, and that any claim the bakery might have had against it was
extinguished by the release executed by the bread company in favor
of the defendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and held that a limitation of liability or disclaimer
is valid and enforceable in Florida against the ultimate consumer, and
it was therefore binding upon the plaintiff-bakery."' 3 The court left unanswered the question of the validity of the release and its effect upon the
plaintiff's right to maintain an action for breach of the warranties contained in the contract. The court did state, however, that whether there
was an agency relationship between the plaintiff and the bread company
and whether this relationship was known to the defendant can company
"would be determinative of whether or not this was a situation in which
34
a release by an undisclosed agent was binding on the principal.'
An implied warranty of fitness or merchantability is not applicable
to a retail druggist so as to render him strictly liable to a purchaser for
the harmful effects caused by unadulterated drugs dispensed by him on a
doctor's prescription. 3 Nor is an implied warranty of fitness or meror any claim relating to the containers sold under this agreement. In no event shall
the supplier's liability exceed the cost to the buyer of the defective containers and
any materials packed in them. American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d
730, 731 (5th Cir. 1965).
133. Cf. Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
134. American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1965).
135. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965), affirming 167 So.2d 901
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The Supreme Court of Florida in rejecting a theory of strict liability
stated:
ET]he rights of the consumer can be preserved, and the responsibilities of the
retail prescription druggist can be imposed, under the concept that a druggist who
sells a prescription warrants that (1) he will compound the drug prescribed; (2)
he has used due and proper care in filling the prescription (failure of which might
also give rise to an action in negligence) ; (3) the proper methods were used in the
compounding process; (4) the drug has not been infected with some adulterating
foreign substance. Id. at 739.
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chantability applicable to an engineer who prepared defective plans or
designs. 130
D. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
1.

INJURIES INVOLVING FALLS

The recent slip and fall cases involving defendant supermarkets
were disposed of by the appellate courts on the basis that the defendant
did not have time to warn of, or remove the foreign substance from the
floor,1 7 or on the basis that there was no evidence that the defendant had

actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the foreign substance on the floor.' However, in one case,139 where there was no direct
evidence as to how long a green bean had been on the floor, the appellate
court stated that
evidence that no inspection had been made during a particular
period of time prior to an accident may warrant an inference
that the dangerous condition existed long enough so that the
exercise of reasonable care would have resulted in discovery. 4 °
Knowledge of the dangerous condition was an issue in Miami Shores
Village v. Lingler."1' In that case, the plaintiff fell over exposed reinforcing rods protruding onto the sidewalk from a concrete parking
bumper. The defendant city had placed the bumper in the street which
occupied the same level as the sidewalk. There was evidence that the
bumper was discolored and very badly weathered. The appellate court,
in affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, stated that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the city had notice that the bumper
protruded onto the sidewalk, but the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the city had ample time to be put on notice that a dangerous condition existed. The court concluded that the city was liable because by
allowing the bumper to remain in its deteriorated condition, a dangerous
condition was permitted to exist, and by permitting this condition to
exist, the city created an unreasonable risk that the bumper would be
moved onto the sidewalk and become a hazard to persons travelling
thereon .

42

136. Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Associates, Inc., 168 So.2d
333 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). But the engineer can be held liable in a negligence action.
137. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Heiser, 156 So.2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (mayon-

naise on floor for ninety seconds).
138. Grand Union Supermarkets, Inc. v. Griffin, 156 So.2d 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963)
(fruit pit with a piece of fruit attached). Accord, Lewis v. Rogers, 164 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1964) (vegetable substance).
139. Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).

140. Id. at 591. (Emphasis added.)
141. 157 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
142. The court stated: (Tihe risk reasonably to be foreseen included the possibility
that the bumper, left readily accessible to automobiles being parked, would be moved about
and become a hazard to persons on the adjoining sidewalk. Miami Shores Village v. Lingler,
157 So.2d 716, 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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In another slip and fall case, 4 8 the appellate court held that it was
reversible error to admit into evidence proof of subsequent repairs on
the issue of the defendant's negligence in failing to repair the prior
defective condition.
In Grall v. Risden,'" the plaintiff-appellee tripped over a tie-rod
which was used to support a canopy over the entrance to the defendant's
restaurant. The appellate court in reversing a summary judgment for
the plaintiff, held that the duty owed to an invitee is to warn of latent
defects, but where the defect is obvious and could have been seen by one
exercising due care, the plaintiff's failure to look constitutes contributory
negligence as a matter of law. 48
But where a plaintiff-invitee trips over a dress rack left in an aisle
of the defendant's store, she is entitled to have her case submitted to the
jury on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence. 48
2.

INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS

An inspection by a painter was held sufficient to relieve a store owner
from liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when an overhead air
conditioning duct fell upon her while she was shopping. 47
A business invitee who walks through a glass door is not chargeable
with actual knowledge of the door merely because it was capable of being
seen had the invitee looked. 48 Rather, the invitee is held, in such a case,
only to that standard of care that an ordinary reasonable person would
exercise under the same circumstances as confronted the invitee at the
time he walked through the door. 4 9
There is no duty to warn a licensee of an entrance way almost entirely surrounded by glass. 5 0
143. City of Niceville v. Hardy, 160 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) (defective water
meter box).
'144. 167 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
145. Compare Grail v. Risden, 167 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) with Isenberg v.
Ortona Park Recreational Center, Inc., 160 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) and Conwell
v. Zayre of Miami, Inc., 161 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). Cf. Milby v. Pace Pontiac,
Inc., 176 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) where an invitee tripped and fell over a step
down into the defendant's building. She alleged that she looked but did not see the defect.
The court stated:
Whether the plaintiff was exercising due care and whether the defendant owed a
duty to warn is not determined by deciding that the object was "latent" or "patent."
The "latency" or "patency" of the condition and the defendant's duty to warn is
determined by asking the question: Would a reasonable and prudent person, exercising due care, have observed the object? Id. at 557.
146. Conwell v. Zayre of Miami, Inc., 161 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
147. Nutt v. James City, Inc., 162 So.2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (inspection two months
prior to accident).
148. Isenberg v. Ortona Park Recreational Center, Inc., 160 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964). Accord, Peppermint Twist, Inc. v. Wright, 169 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (no
markings on door).
149. Ibid.
150. Jensen v. Grace Lutheran Church, 163 So.2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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Two decisions'"' involved the question of the landowner's duty to
the employees of an independent contractor working in the vicinity of
overhead energized electrical power lines. The courts in both cases held
that the landowner's duty is to warn his business invitees of the dangerous
condition, but that duty does not arise unless the landowner has superior
knowledge.' 52 The landowners in neither case had superior knowledge.
A motel owner owes a duty to his guests not to furnish overheated
water.' To his visitors, a motel owner owes a duty to construct his
54
shuffleboard courts so that they are free from traps.1
A plaintiff's status upon the land can change.1 5 5 However, a minor

visiting the defendant's construction site is a licensee and his status does
not change to that of an invitee merely because an employee, not authorized to seek help, requests the minor to assist him in moving some
sheetrock. 158
The usual test used to determine the plaintiff's status on the land
is the benefit test. That is, if the relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant is beneficial to the defendant, or to both the plaintiff and
the defendant, the plaintiff is regarded as an invitee. In the absence of a
benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff is a licensee. 5" This test, however,
has been qualified in the case of a social guest. This qualification is illustrated by the rule that a social guest's status as a licensee is not
changed to that of an invitee merely because he performs some incidental
service that is beneficial to the defendant. 5 Therefore, in determining
the status of an injured plaintiff who entered the land as a social guest
there is a problem of whether at the time of the injury 59 the plaintiff
was a social guest performing a service incidental to his visit, or whether
the status of the plaintiff has changed to that of an invitee because he
conferred a benefit upon the owner.
This problem of the changing status of a social guest arose in Brant
v. Matlin.8 ° In that case, the plaintiff entered upon the land as a social
151. Quinnelly v. Southern Maid Syrup Co., 164 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (crane
boom came in contact with wires); Somers v. Meyers, 171 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965)
(dump truck touched wires).
152. Accord, Waters v. Rockana Carriers, Inc., 171 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965)
(truck owner's duty to business invitees).
153. Black v. Heininger, 163 So.2d 3 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (scalding water in shower).
154. Miceli v. Lifter, 161 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (piece of two by four painted
black).
155. McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957) (parishioner attending church is a
licensee).
156. Bullard v. Robin Constr.'Corp., 171 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
157. Supra note 155.
158. Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
159. The plaintiff's status on the land is to be determined as of the time of the injury.
Sanders v. Brown, 73 Ariz. 116, 238 P.2d 941 (1951); Drews v. Mason, 29 I1. App. 2d
269, 172 N.E.2d 383 (1961). Accord, Brant v. Matlin, 172 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
160. 172 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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guest in order to attend a Bar Mitzvah. However, after the "social event"
was over, the defendant requested the plaintiff to remain on the land and
take care of the defendant's children, while the defendant and his wife
went on a vacation. The plaintiff was injured while taking care of the
children. The Third District Court of Appeal, affirming that the plaintiff
was an invitee, originated what might properly be denominated the "but
for" test, which is to be applied to determine the changing status of a
social guest. The test applied by the court is suggested in the following
language:
But for this service performed, would the plaintiff have left the
premises and removed himself from the danger created by the
defendant-land owner's negligence. If the answer is no, then
the services performed can be considered incidental to the social
visit, and the plaintiff would be properly classified as a licensee.
On the other hand, if the answer is yes, then the services performed are not merely incidental to the social visit, and the
plaintiff must be accorded the status of an invitee. 6 '
A minor who has been warned by his father of the danger of his
presence around or near the defendant's steam roller, is a wilful trespasser and is subject to the same standard of care owed by a defendant'
to a trespassing adult. 63
The attractive nuisance doctrine was not available to a minor who
was injured by a shopping cart, because the presence of the shopping
cart did not constitute an inherently dangerous condition.'6 4 Nor was the
attractive nuisance doctrine available to the parents of a minor who was
electrocuted at the top of defendant's electric pole, because an electric
pole, even though a means of climbing it was provided, is not an attractive nuisance as a matter of law.'6
E. Master-Servant
Where an employer undertakes to steady a shaky stepladder upon
which his employee is standing, he is under a duty to continue the service
until the employee is no longer in a hazardous position. 6
An employer is not negligent for hiring an employee with criminal
161. Brant v. Matlin, 172 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
162. The standard of care owed to a trespasser is to refrain from wilfully or wantonly
inflicting injury.
163. Green v. Manly Constr. Co., 159 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Circumstances
did not warrant an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.
164. Borden v. Sakolsky, 175 So.2d 209 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
165. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Lariscy, 166 So.2d 227 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). For a correct
statement of the attractive nuisance doctrine see the jury instructions of the trial court
quoted at 228-29.
166. Cox v. Wagner, 162 So.2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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propensities, unless the employee exhibited his true character prior to
167
the commission of the criminal act.
When a maitre d' follows a customer, who has refused to pay for his
meal, out of his employer's restaurant and into a motel next door, and
he there commits an assault and battery upon the customer, it is for the
jury to determine whether or not the employee was acting within the
scope of his employment when the intentional tort was committed. 68
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price,'69 the defendant, who was
the owner of a dangerous instrumentality, hired an independent contractor to energize a new electrical distribution system. The plaintiff was
an employee of the independent contractor and was injured due to the
negligence of a fellow employee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
was liable for his injuries under the dangerous instrumentality 170 and
dangerous work doctrines.17 ' The Supreme Court of Florida, in a rather
nebulous opinion, held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and
the dangerous work doctrine will not render an owner who employs an
independent contractor liable to an injured employee of the independent

contractor.
F. Defenses
1.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

When the State of Florida, which is entitled to sovereign immunity,
brings a negligence action to recover damages for destruction of its radio
tower, the defendant may properly assert the affirmative defense that
the State was contributorily negligent. 72
The distraction rule"' is applicable where a plaintiff knew about a
defective condition, but was distracted by a sufficient cause so that he
momentarily forgot about the dangerous condition that was responsible
for his injury. When the distraction rule is applicable, the question of
167. Davis v. Major Oil Co., 164 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The employee shot
the plaintiff after an argument over the use by the plaintiff of a pay telephone on the
defendant-employer's premises.
168. Columbia By the Sea, Inc. v. Petty, 157 So.2d 190 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
169. 170 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1964), reversing 159 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). See
Note, The Inapplicability of the Inherently Dangerous Activity Doctrine to Employees of
an Independent Contractor, 19 U. MIAmi L. REv. 480 (1965).
170. For a correct statement of the doctrine see note i supra.
171. The inherently dangerous work doctrine renders an employer of an independent
contractor liable to injured third persons for his failure to take proper precautions to prevent
injuries to such third persons when the work contracted to be performed is inherently
dangerous. This doctrine is an exception to the common law rule that an employer is not
liable to third persons when the work causing the injury is performed by an independent
contractor. PROSSER, TORTS, § 70, at 480, 484 (3d ed. 1964).
172. Department of Public Safety v. Parker, 161 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964)
(apparently a case of first impression).
173. Cf. PaossEa, Toa § 32 n.74 (3d ed. 1964).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

the plaintiff's contributory negligence is for the jury 7 4 However, it is
for the court to determine whether the circumstances in the case were a
sufficient cause to warrant the plaintiff's distraction. 7 " Therefore, where
the court determined that the plaintiff's duties in unloading a defective
truck were not a sufficient cause to warrant his distraction, the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.'
2.

IMMUNITY

The Florida Supreme Court took a gargantuan step toward abolition
of municipal tort immunity in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach' 77
when they abolished municipal immunity for negligent torts committed
by municipal employees acting within the scope of their employment.
After Hargrove, however, a number of cases posed the question of
whether a municipality was liable for the intentional torts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. The Third District Court of Appeal was confronted with this question in Simpson v.
City of Miami' 78 and held the municipality liable on the basis that the
principles announced in the Hargrove decision were equally applicable
to intentional torts. There were, however, decisions by the First and
Second District Courts of Appeal to the contrary. 9
Because of the existing conflicts, 8 0 and the great public interest in
the question of municipal liability for intentional torts, the Supreme
Court of Florida took jurisdiction,' 8 ' and in discharging the writ, approved the decision arrived at by the Third District Court in Simpson
v. City of Miami.'82 The Court held that the Third District Court was
eminently correct in imposing liability on a municipal corporation for
intentional torts committed by its employees within the scope of their
employment.
174. Tomlinson v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 165 So.2d 801 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964)
(dictum).
175. Tomlinson v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 165 So.2d 801 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
176. Ibid.
177. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957). Hargrove imposed liability upon municipalities for the
negligent torts of their employees committed within the scope of their employment. The
decision abolished the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions of a
municipality, and instead predicated liability upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
See Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal
History, 17 U. MiAMz L. Rav. 475 (1963).

178. 155 So.2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), aff'd, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965).
179. E.g., Rose v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 163 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), cert.

granted, 172 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1965) ; Middleton v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
180. Middleton v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959);
Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So.2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
181. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965).
182. 155 So.2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), aff'd, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965).

1966]

TORTS

Even with municipal immunity in tort actions abrogated," 3 there is
still a drawback to the successful maintenance of a tort action against a
municipality. This drawback is evident where a municipality has an ordinance or charter provision that requires written notice of the claim
within a certain length of time after the injury occurs. These ordinances
are valid and are not violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution.'- 4 Compliance with the ordinance or charter provision is 18a5
condition precedent to the maintenance of an action on the tort claim,
therefore the complaint must contain an allegation of compliance, otherwise it will be defective. 8 6 However, substantial compliance with the
notice requirement of the charter or ordinance has been held sufficient
to estop the city from asserting that the notice was not in the form required by the statute.' 87 Even where there is not compliance with the
written notice requirement, a city will be held to have waived the notice
requirement or will be held to be estopped to assert failure to give written notice where the city had actual notice, investigated the accident, and
following the investigation initiated such action in relation to the injured
party as would lead a reasonable person to assume that further notice
was unnecessary or would cause the injured party to act or fail to act
to his detriment. 188 Estoppel to assert the defense of failure to give notice
has also been applied where the plaintiff erroneously notified the director
of the department of water and sewers instead of the city attorney as
required by the city charter. 8 9
Another problem arising in relation to written notice to the municipality was suggested in Nickolson v. City of St. Petersburg."" In that
case the plaintiff proceeded on a contract theory to recover for her personal injuries sustained while riding on a city bus. The statute' 9' provided that written notice of the personal injury be served upon the city
manager. The plaintiff did not comply with the statute. The issue pre183. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (negligent torts);
City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965) (intentional torts).
184. McCann v. City of Lake Wales, 144 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962).
185. Butts v. Dade County, 174 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
186. City of Miami Beach v. O'Hara, 166 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
187. Finneran v. City of Lake Worth, 152 So.2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
188. Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1965), quashing
168 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Tillman v. City of Pompano Beach, 100 So.2d 53
(Fla. 1957).
189. Brooks v. City of Miami, 161 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
190. 163 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). See Butts v. Dade County, 174 So.2d 78Z
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
191. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18896 § 1, at 1635 provides:
From and after the passage of this Act no suit shall be instituted or maintained
against the City of St. Petersburg, Florida for damages arising out of any personal
injury unless written notice of such claim or injury is within sixty days from the
date of receiving alleged injury, given to the City Manager of the City of St.
Petersburg with specifications as to the time and place of said alleged injury.
(Emphasis added.)
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sented, therefore, was whether a plaintiff must give the statutory notice
when proceeding against a municipality to recover for personal injuries
caused by the alleged violation of a contractual obligation. Finding no
Florida precedent, the Second District Court of Appeal, in holding that
notice in such a case would be required, stated: "[T]he fact that the
person injured is suing under a contract theory rather than a tort theory
should make no difference so long as the ordinance simply specifies that
notice shall be given 'for damages arising out of any personal injury.' ""'
At this point it should be mentioned that in 1965 the legislature
adopted Florida Statute section 95.241, which prescribes a uniform type
of notice that must be given to the municipality before an action can be
maintained for the alleged tort. Section 95.241(1) requires that the
claimant serve written notice upon certain enumerated municipal or city
officials within 90 days after the occurrence or discovery of the injury.
This section is applicable only if the injury is caused by the municipality's negligent maintenance of any public sidewalk, pavement, street,
bridge, or other improved realty owned or maintained by the municipality. If the claimant fails to comply with this section, but alleges that
the city or municipality had actual notice, then according to section
95.241(1), the injured party must show, as a matter of law, that the
municipality has not been prejudiced by the failure to give the requisite
written notice. In any other tort action against a municipality, written
notice of the claim is not, according to section 95.241(2), a condition
precedent to the maintenance of the action. Any ordinance or municipal
charter provision which conflicts with this statute is declared invalid by
section 95.241(4).
In Waters v.Ray,'1 a question of the immunity of a municipal judge
had to be decided after the judge ordered the plaintiff arrested for failure
to have a proper driver's license. The defendant-judge argued that he
was immune to liability in the plaintiff's action for false imprisonment.
In rejecting this argument, the appellate court stated that the presence
or absence of jurisdiction determines the question of the immunity of a
judicial officer. 94 The court therefore held that the judge was liable for
192. Nicholson v. City of St. Petersburg, 163 So.2d 775, 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
193. 167 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
194. The court stated:
Immunity from, or liability for, acts done by a person while acting in a judicial
capacity depends upon the existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction. The general
rule is if there is jurisdiction no matter how erroneous the decision of the judge
may be, no personal liability attaches to him so long as he acts within the scope of
his jurisdiction and in a judicial capacity. On the other hand if he acts wholly
without jurisdiction his judicial office can afford him no protection. It is well
settled that where a judicial officer causes the arrest or detention of a person
in a proceeding in which he is acting wholly without jurisdiction, he may be held
liable for false imprisonment, for even honesty of purpose cannot justify a clear
usurpation of power. Waters v. Ray, 167 So.2d 326, 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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the false imprisonment because he acted without jurisdiction when he
arrested the plaintiff for the non-existent crime. 95
G. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in Florida to infer that the defendant's negligence was the cause of a fire of unknown origin.' 96 However, res ipsa loquitur is applicable to raise an inference of negligence
and call forth the defendant to explain 197 how the accident occurred when
(1) the instrumentality involved was within the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the injury, both as to operation and inspection; (2) the injury was not the result of any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff;
and (3) the accident 1would
not have occurred had the de98
fendant used due care.

The above elements, requisite for the application of res ipsa loquitur,
were found by the appellate court to be present in Stanek v. Houston,'9 9
where the defendant's tractor trailer crashed into a restaurant and injured the plaintiff. The defendant-driver had crossed a railroad track at
thirty-five miles per hour, about three hundred feet north of the point
of impact. The defendant-driver applied the brakes, but the tractortrailer went off the road, struck a parked car, and then crashed into the
building. The plaintiff who was working inside was injured. The driver,
who had driven the truck extensively was unable to explain how the accident occurred, but he did testify that "the steering wheel felt like
it done come free." The defendant-owner testified that he knew nothing
about any mechanical defects in the truck. There was no other evidence
as to how the collision occurred. The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case. The Second District Court
of Appeal reversed the judgment for the defendant, and held that res ipsa
loquitur was applicable to call forth the defendant to explain why he
was not responsible for the accident.
IV.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

A. Invasion of Privacy
The inclusion of a person's name on a primary election ballot without his consent is an invasion of his right to privacy. 00
195. The court found that the judge acted without jurisdiction because there was no
law that a person must have a driver's license, and therefore the arrest was a nullity.
196. Sharon v. Luten, 165 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
197. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and does not shift the burden of proof. It
merely imposes a duty upon the defendant to come forth and explain the accident.
198. Stanek v. Houston, 165 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
199. 165 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
200. Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1964) (dicta) (a case of first impression).
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The Second District Court of Appeal, in a case of first impression, 201
indicated that a plaintiff, who is also a plaintiff in a personal injury suit,
could maintain a separate cause of action for invasion of privacy based
upon the defendant's investigation into the authenticity of the plaintiff's
personal injury claim. The court did state however, that the plaintiff in
a personal injury suit must expect some investigation of her claim, and
that the unintentional exposure of the defendant's private investigator
would not give rise to liability for invasion of privacy.
20 2

B. Malicious Prosecution

Where there is probable cause for the sheriff to issue a search warrant, and the warrant is lawfully acted upon, a plaintiff may not sue in
tort for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, even though the
plaintiff was discharged at a preliminary hearing.20 3
It is for the court to say what facts or circumstances constitute probable cause, but it is for the jury to determine whether or not the facts
or circumstances were as alleged. 0 4 And from the fact of probable cause,
the jury may infer the element of malice.20 ' However, probable cause and
"advice of counsel" are affirmative defenses to a malicious prosecution
suit based upon action taken by the defendant for alleged zoning viola20 6
tions by the plaintiff.
C. Conversion
The defendant-appellants in Goodrich v. Malowney 20 7 secretly had
themselves appointed as trustees of the plaintiff's stock. At a secret stockholder's meeting they voted plaintiff's shares of stock and thereby voted
plaintiff out of the office of president of the corporation. The plaintiff
demanded the return of the stock but the defendants refused. The
201.
202.
suit are
(1)

Tucker v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
The elements requisite for the successful maintenance of a malicious prosecution
as follows:
The commencement or continuance of an original civil or criminal judicial proceeding;
(2) Its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant
in the original proceeding;
(3) Its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff;
(4) The absence of probable cause for such proceedings;
(5) The presence of malice therein;
(6) Damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.
If any one of these elements is lacking, the result is fatal to the action. Wilson v. O'Neal,
118 So.2d 101, 104 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). Accord, Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So.2d 755 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1963).
203. Sanchez v. Buchanan, 175 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
204. Wagner v. Smith, 174 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
205. Azrikan v. O'Brien, 173 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
206. Herbeck v. Holdeman, 163 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
207. 157 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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Second District Court of Appeal, in affirming an award of compensatory
and punitive damages for the plaintiff, held that the unauthorized act of
voting the stock was an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over the
property belonging to the plaintiff and was inconsistent with his ownership of it. The court concluded by holding that the plaintiff's demand for
the return of the stock, and the defendant's refusal to do so, conclusively
established the conversion.
In a case of first impression,2 08 Adjmi fraudulently obtained two
hundred thousand dollars worth of governmental bearer bonds from the
plaintiff. Adjmi turned the bonds over to the defendant for collection.
The defendant redeemed the bonds and turned the proceeds over to
Adjmi who then absconded. The Third District Court of Appeal, in affirming that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action, held that
an agent of the converter of a negotiable instrument is not liable to the
plaintiff for the conversion. This holding is in accord with the position
espoused in the Restatement of Agency 20 and clearly represents an exception to the general rule that the agent of the converter is liable for
the conversion.
In another very significant 210 case of first impression, 211 the plaintiffappellant was the holder of a first mortgage on a power-brake which had
been in the defendant's possession. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint
that the defendant violated two penal statutes 212 which forbade the
removal of a mortgaged chattel from the county without the permission
of the mortgagee. The plaintiff demanded compensatory and punitive
damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action apparently holding that violation of the penal statutes did
not give rise to a civil cause of action. The Third District Court of Appeal, in an opinion reversing the dismissal, reasoned that the plaintiff was
the person intended by the legislature to be protected by the statutes and
therefore the statutes must be construed to impose a duty upon the defendant not to injure the plaintiff. The court concluded that a breach of
this duty as evidenced by the alleged violation of the statutes, gave rise
to a cause of action. The court, however, was careful to point out that
this case did not involve a violation of a penal statute as evidence of
negligence, but rather it involved a violation of a penal statute as amounting to an intentional tort.2 13
208. McAlister v. Bache & Co., 169 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
209. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 349(g) (1958).

210. The case is significant because the plaintiff as mortgagee with no right to immediate possession could not maintain an action for conversion.
211. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
212. FLA. STAT. §§ 818.01, 818.03 (1963).
213. The court also stated that punitive damages could be recovered because one of
the requisite elements for a violation of the statutes was that the removal of the mortgaged
chattel had to be with the intent to defeat the plaintiff's rights therein.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

D. Libel and Slander
In a case of first impression, 14 the Second District Court of Appeal
was confronted by an issue of a newspaper's qualified privilege to publish
the contents of an official police report of a current investigation into the
alleged commission of a crime. The articles published by the defendantnewspaper were held by the trial court to be libel per se because they
imputed to the plaintiff the commission of a crime. The defendant asserted the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. The appellate court
in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, held that a newspaper's qualified
privilege permits publication of matters about which the public has a
right to be informed, and that these matters include: (1) open violations
of the law; (2) public misconduct which would justify police interference; and (3) matters connected with investigations or prosecutions
for alleged crimes. 21" The court stated that the newspaper's qualified
privilege permits publication of these matters "even though the publication may reflect on the actors and tend to bring them into public disgrace or contempt. ' " 16 The court, however, did hold that a basic requirement for the invocation of the defense of qualified privilege is that the
article must have been fair, accurate and published without malice. In
the instant case, the court rejected the defendant's claim of qualified
privilege because the article, as published, imputed the commission of a
crime to the plaintiff when in fact the plaintiff had never been charged
with a crime. The court concluded therefore that the article could not
be deemed fair and accurate.
The plaintiff-appellant, in another case of first impression, 1 7 was
a former Dade County Sheriff. He brought an action for libel against
the former County Manager. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
the defendant read a defamatory statement which explained the reason
for his dismissal from office by the defendant to the members of the
Board of County Commissioners. The plaintiff further alleged that at the
time of the publication of the libel, the Board was neither investigating,
nor inquiring, nor had they requested the report from the defendant.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding as a
matter of law that the defendant had an absolute privilege to communicate and publish the alleged libel. The appellate court viewed the issue as
whether an executive county official was to be afforded an absolute privilege in regard to defamatory publications made in connection with his
office. The court held that on the facts of the case, the issue had to be
answered in the negative. In reversing and remanding, the court did note,
214.
215.
216.
217.

O'Neal v. Tribune Co., 176 So.2d 53S (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
Id. at 547.
Ibid.
Kelly v. McNayr, 175 So.2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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however, that the doctrine of qualified privilege was applicable."' On
certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, the district court's opinion was
quashed. 219 The supreme court held that

executive officials of government are absolutely privileged as
to defamatory publications made in connection with the performance of the duties and responsibilities of their office .... 220
In a per curian opinion,22 ' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant granted in an action by
the plaintiff (for only punitive damages) wherein he had alleged that
he was a holder of a credit card issued by the defendant and that the
defendant erroneously included his name on a list of persons whose credit
had been cancelled causing him to be refused credit at a restaurant, and
that inclusion of his name on the list was libel per se.
V. DAMAGES
The Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. City of Miami'

22

held that

punitive damages may not be assessed against a municipality in an action where the municipality has been found vicariously liable for the intentional torts of its employees.223
In Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc.,224 the Supreme Court of Florida

approved the Second District Court of Appeal's decision2 25 that in a
case where there are joint tortfeasors, evidence of the financial worth of
each defendant shall be admissible on the issue of punitive damages.
However, the court went even further than mere approval of the appellate
court's opinion by declaring:
[I]n all cases tried after the effective date of this opinion, and
in which the element of punitive damages against joint tort218. The court explained the applicability of the doctrine of qualified privilege by the
following quotation:
Where a person is so situated that it becomes right, in the interest of society, that
he should tell to a third person certain facts, then, if he bona fide and without
malice, does tell them, it is a privileged communication. Id. at 569-70.
219. McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966).
220. Id. at 433. After a careful reading of the court's opinion, certain questions remain
unanswered. Does the court's decision apply only to county executive officials, and if so,
does it apply to executive officials from all counties, or only to Dade County executive
officials? Do municipal and city executive officials have an absolute privilege also, or did
the court mean that only county or higher state executive officials have an absolute privilege?
It appears that at least one of these latter questions has been answered in Saxon v. Knowles,
185 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). There the appellate court held that a city manager,
as an executive official, has an absolute privilege in regard to defamatory publications made
within the scope of his employment.
221. Jennings v. American Express Co., 338 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1964).
222. 172 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1965), affirming 160 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
223. The abrogation of municipal tort immunity is discussed supra text Part Il § F2.
224. 182 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
225. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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feasors is an issue for determination, a special or separate verdict shall be used for the assessment of punitive damages against
each tortfeasor. Verdicts for compensatory damages shall continue as at present to be joint and several. Judgments shall be
entered in accord with the verdicts rendered. 2
2'27 returned
The jury in City of Hialeah v. Hutchins
a verdict against
the defendant-police officer and against the defendant-city which was
vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the assault and battery committed by the officer. Compensatory damages in
the amount of 1,227.25 dollars were assessed against the police officer.
The defendant city's assessment of compensatory damages was over
32,000 dollars. On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in
entering judgment on the verdicts for the reason that a verdict for compensatory damages against one joint tortfeasor establishes the extent
of the liability of both. The court concluded therefore that the disproportionate verdicts could not stand.
In Elowsky v. Gulf Power Co.,22 the First District Court of Appeal
held that loss of ornamental value of a tree that had been wrongfully
cut down by the defendant was a proper item of damages in a trespass
action.229
A recovery of 1,000 dollars by the plaintiff dog owner in an action
against a kennel owner for the loss of the plaintiff's "blue blood" German
23 0
Shepherd was upheld by the appellate court in Wertman v. Tipping.
The court stated that the damages in such a case extend to the value
of any special usefulness that the dog might have had and includes
services that the dog performed for the owner.
The Supreme Court of Florida in La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc.,21 1 held that the plaintiff's mental anguish suffered as a result
of the defendant's malicious killing of her dog was compensable, even
though the plaintiff did not witness the actual killing.
In Shaw v. Puleo,232 the jury rejected the expert testimony of a
physician in regard to the plaintiff's whiplash injury, which was of the
type not detectable by casual observation, and awarded the plaintiff
"none" damages. The physician's testimony had not been contradicted
by any other medical testimony. The Supreme Court of Florida, in
226. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So.2d 402-403 (Fla. 1965).
227. 166 So.2d 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
228. 172 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).

229. Compare Nilsson v. H1iscox, 158 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963) which was an
action for trespass and conversion of trees.
230. 166 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
231. 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964), reversing 158 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Note,
Recovery for Mental Anguish Caused by Malicious Destruction of Pet Dog, 19 U. MIA
L. REv. 307 (1964).
232. 159 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1964).
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reversing an order granting the plaintiff a new trial, held that a jury may
reject expert medical testimony even though the facts attested to are not
within the ordinary experience of the jurors. The court stated that the
jury is free to determine the credibility of such testimony and to decide
the weight to be ascribed to it in the face of conflicting lay evidence.
VI. NUISANCE
233
The plaintiff-appellant in Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
owned a restaurant which adjoined a municipal airport. The jet airplanes
belonging to the four defendant-commercial airlines warmed up, took off,
and landed on a runway near the plaintiff's restaurant. Essentially the
plaintiff's complaint, which demanded damages, sounded like an action
for the maintenance of a private nuisance, but there was also an allegation of inverse condemnation. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the appellate court
'
viewed the appeal as a question of "a landowner's rights in the jet age. 1134
The appellate court found the complaint fatal in so far as it alleged the
existence of a private nuisance because it did not allege sufficient facts
to bring the case within the rule that the invasion claimed to be a
nuisance must be unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful. The court evidenced a very liberal attitude in this regard when it stated that
people who establish a business on property adjoining an airport
do so with the knowledge that changes and improvements are
being, and will continue to be, made in aircraft using the airport, requiring different flight patterns and different procedures
in warm-up, take-off, and landing in the interest of the safety
of the human lives aboard the planes .... "I
Turning to the allegation of inverse condemnation, the appellate court,
on the basis of Griggs v. Alleghany County,236 held that the owner or

operator of the airport would perhaps be liable for inversely condemning
the plaintiff's property, but that the defendant-commercial airlines who
merely used the airport would definitely not be liable under this theory. 3 '
VII. LEGISLATION

The Florida Legislature, in 1965, followed the precedent set by many
other state legislatures by adopting a "Good Samaritan" act.2 8 The act,39
which is effective as of July 1, 1965, applies to any person, including a
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

166 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So.2d 196, 201 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
Id. at 202.
369 U.S. 84 (1962).
See Nuisance-As a "Taking" of Property, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 537 (1963).
E.g., TEXAs STAT. ANN. art. la (Vernon Supp. 1961); CAL. BusmSs AND PRo-

PESSIONS § 2144

(Deering 1937).

239. FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (1965).

860
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physician, who in good faith renders emergency care or treatment at
the scene of an accident without the objection of the victim. The effect
of the act is to absolve or insulate the Good Samaritan from any civil
liability which might arise as a result of such care provided that he acted
as an ordinary reasonably prudent man would have acted under the
same or similar circumstances.

